Patient Safety: by CHOICE not by CHANCE!

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OBJECTIVES

- Identify three common threads in organizational accidents.
- Compare/Contrast how organizational cultures handle safety information.
- > Define three necessary features of safety cultures.
- Describe three individual characteristics that support safe environments.

What is Safety?

- Safety is more defined by its ABSENCE than its PRESENCE
- The absence of negative effects
- It is a dynamic non-event
- > We can't see safety; but we readily see the lack of it
- Safety is never absolute/no total freedom from danger

Organizational Accidents in High Risk Industries

- Can be devastating
- Occur rarely
- Hard to predict luck plays a part
- Technological innovations system/human interface



Common Threads in Organizational Accidents

- Economic drivers to stay afloat
- Establishment of latent conditions
- > Often front line error, breach, or slip
- > Lack of respect for accident potential
- Deterioration of defenses/holes in the swiss cheese



- Production vs Protection
- Production is necessary to allow for protection - need a balance
- > It is in the short term that conflicts occur
- > Can apply this concept to individuals
- Choices are made; most cases no bad effects; process becomes habitual; vulnerability


Latent Conditions/Error Precursors

- Management decisions
- based on strategic goals; can't foresee everything; forecasting, budgeting, planning
- Resource allocation, scheduling
- Inadequate training
- Equipment failures/lack of equipment
- Unworkable procedures/lack of procedure
- Ambiguity in procedures
- > Undue time pressure/elimination of OT
- Development of work-arounds



The Failure Sequence in High Risk Systems

(What Root Cause Analysis Consistently Demonstrates)



Forgetting to be Afraid

- Bad outcomes are rare; few have direct experience with them
- Act as if we are invulnerable; our upbringing as skilled clinicians
- Reliance on other disciplines being perfect
- Nothing has happened therefore nothing will happen


Forgetting to be Afraid

- "Accidents occur not because we gamble and lose,
 - Accidents occur because people do not believe that the accident that is about to occur is at all possible."

Wagenaar and Groeneweg
 Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents



System Failure Leading to Error



How Do Organizational Cultures Handle Safety Information?



Organizational Cultures

Pathologic -

don't want to know; shoot the messenger; failure is punished; new ideas discouraged

Bureaucratic -

may or may not find out; local fixes; new ideas present problems

 Generative/High Reliability –
 Actively seek; messengers rewarded; failure leads to global reforms; new ideas welcomed

Hallmarks of High Reliability Organizations (HROs)

•Sensitivity to Operations

•Preoccupation with Failure – what could go wrong?

•Reluctance to Simplify - it could happen here

•Commitment to Resilience – pick yourself back up; coping with the unexpected

•Deference to Expertise - ask for help



Safety Culture

- Emerges gradually

 Process of collective learning
- Persistent and successful application of practical and down to earth measures
- Guiding values are crystal clear to those on the front lines; flexible
- > Informed (data driven), reporting, and just

Features of Safety Cultures

Systems thinking

- Planning- Huddles, Checklists, Drills, Simulations
- Workload Management
 Re-positioning, Assignments, Acuity/task checks
- Successful consultation
 Willingness to speak up and a willingness to listen
- Situation Awareness in the same movie
- Collective Mindfulness/Support of individual mindfulness



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Collective Mindfulness

- > Assumes that error is not isolated
- Believes in the convergence of contributing factors
- Generalizes "fixes"
- > Does not take the past as an infallible guide to the future
- > Pre-occupied with the possibility of failure



What are the Individual Characteristics that Support Safe Environments?



Human Contributions to Safety

- Behavioral Choices
- Teamwork/Communication
- Assessing Risky Situations
- > Taking a Stand willingness and commitment to go the extra mile (red rules)
- > Effort, diligence, and attention to details make a difference (discipline)
- Realistic optimism the power of positive thinking; confidence



Emphasizing Behavioral Choices

- At-risk behaviors choice to drift
 - Production vs Protection rewarded at times
 - No intent for bad outcomes
 - Perception of risk fades or is believed justified
 - Coach
- Reckless behaviors cross the line
 - Knowingly put people in harms way
 - Conscious disregard
 - Self only
 - Punishment



The 3 Faces of Violations

- Skill Based
 - Corner cutting, routine, inelegant procedures
 - · Rarely punish violation or reward compliance
- Rule Based
 - Can be necessary and situational
 - Benefits seen as outweighing the costs
 - Workplace deficiencies
- Knowledge Based novel situations with little or no guidance




Human as Hero

- Becoming "error wise"
- Individual mindfulness
 - A mindset that expects unpleasant surprise
 - Aware of hazards, contingencies in place
 - Respectful of the dangers
- Paradox of safety management



Optimizing Front Line Performance



Rather than the cause of the event, the practitioner is the solution for faulty

> Practitioner actions are often the final defense against


Downside of Human as Hero

- Nursing culture of "ploughing through to get the job done"
- Fixing things on the local level/work-arounds obscure organizational shortcomings
- Seeking assistance from a peer rather than a manager who can affect system change



Acquiring Error Wisdom

Three Bucket Model





Self

- Generally stable
- Bad stuff

 Inexperience, fatigue, life events etc.
- Good Stuff
 - Experience, knowledge, fitness etc.
 - · Custodial attention
 - Discretional energy



Nature of the Context

- Labile
- Bad stuff
 - Distractions
 - Interruptions
 - Lack of time
- Good stuff
- Good teamwork
- Ability to question



Error Potential of the Task

- Labile
- Steps within task may vary
- Less likely to be assessed objectively



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Effective Safety Management

- Balance of Proactive and Reactive Measures
- Commitment
- Motivation a model or just staying ahead of regulation
- Resources factor of money
 Competence
- Competence
 Cognizance
 - State of Intelligent Wariness
- Long term "fitness program"
 constantly assessing and improving basic procedures/part of the core business



Goal of Safety Management

Attainment and preservation of a state of maximum practicable resistance to operational hazards.

